Omniscience and the Arrow of Time by Zagzebski, Linda
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 19 Issue 4 Article 7 
10-1-2002 
Omniscience and the Arrow of Time 
Linda Zagzebski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Zagzebski, Linda (2002) "Omniscience and the Arrow of Time," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 19 : Iss. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol19/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
OMNISCIENCE AND THE ARROW OF TIME 
Linda Zagzebski 
This paper argues that the enduring dilemma of divine foreknowledge and 
human free will is an instance of a much deeper dilemma in the arrow of 
time. The assumption that the past has a kind of necessity that the future 
lacks is inconsistent with the principle that temporal necessity is transferred 
over entailment and the possibility that a proposition about the past entails 
a proposition about the future. A closer look at temporal modality leads to 
the proposal that the causal arrow of time is the underpinning of the modal 
arrow of time. The idea that propositions about the past and their negations 
are not causable, whereas propositions about the future (and perhaps some 
of their negations) are causable is inconsistent with the transfer of causabili-
ty principle and a variety of metaphysical postulates that imply that a 
proposition about the future entails or is entailed by a proposition about the 
past. This dilemma is independent of determinism. No particular way to 
resolve the dilemma is compelling, but is a matter of metaphysical judg-
ment. Positions on free will, determinism, and omniscience are irrelevant to 
solving the dilemma in its most general form. 
I. The modal arrow of time 
One of the ways in which the past and the future are allegedly asym-
metrical is that the past has a kind of necessity the future lacks. Events in 
the past are purportedly necessary simply because they are past, not 
because of any metaphysical properties other than pastness. So it is said 
that we can do nothing about spilled milk, and that is meant to contrast 
with the idea that potentially we can do something about milk that is not 
yet spilled. This modal asymmetry is sometimes associated with an onto-
logical asymmetry- the past is real, the future is not. The ontological 
asymmetry can clearly be questioned, but I mention it to call attention to 
the fact that all of the temporal asymmetries define a property of the past 
by contrast with the future. The nature of an asymmetry is to be two-sided. 
So the idea that the past is closed (fixed, necessary) is one side of a single 
intuition the other side of which is the intuition that the future is open 
(tmfixed, contingent). The Principle of the Necessity of the Past therefore 
has a correlate: the Principle of the Contingency of the Future. 
Perhaps the intuition of the necessity of the past is stronger than the intu-
ition of the contingency of the future. That is possible, but then it is impor-
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tant to see that the rejection of either side of the asymmetry threatens the 
other and suggests that the idea of modal temporal asymmetry is confused. 
If the kind of necessity possessed by the past is possessed by the future, or 
even if it is possible that it is possessed by the future, the necessity of the 
past cannot be something it has simply in virtue of its pastness. 
Sometimes when people say that an event in the past is now necessary 
what they mean is that nobody has any causal power over it. We can lack 
causal power over an event because it is causally necessary or because it is 
in the past, and these are not the same thing. Causal necessity and contin-
gency are not temporally asymmetrical. Roughly, a causally necessary event 
E is one that is such that the conjunction of causal laws and events prior to E 
are sufficient for E to occur, whereas a causally contingent event E is one 
that is such that the conjunction of causal laws and events prior to E are not 
sufficient for E to occur. The causal necessity or contingency of an event has 
nothing to do with whether it is in our past or our future. An event possess-
es causal necessity or contingency in virtue of its enduring relations to other 
events. Assuming the metaphysical law that a cause must precede its effect, 
an event's causal necessity or contingency is determined by its enduring 
relations to events previous to it. But whether or not causes must precede 
effects, the causal modality of an event is not temporally asymmetrical. 
Even if it is possible for an event to be causally necessary because it is deter-
mined by an event later in time, its status as causally necessary never 
changes. There are causally contingent events in the past as well as in the 
future, and there are causally necessary events in the future as well as in the 
past.' When an event has the necessity of the past, its temporal status is suf-
ficient to make it beyond the power of anybody to do anything about it. But 
it can still be causally contingent. Similarly, if an event has the contingency 
of the future, there is nothing about its temporal status that prevents it from 
being such that we can do something about it. But it can still be causally 
necessary. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that an event is tempo-
rally contingent that we can do something about it since the event might be 
beyond our power for some other reason, say, because it is causally neces-
sary. Similarly, it does not follow from the fact that an event is causally con-
tingent that we can do something about it since the event might be beyond 
our power for some other reason, say, because it is in the past. 
So we lack power over causally necessary events and we also lack 
power over the past. The reason why we lack power over the past is pre-
sumably the metaphysical law that causes must precede effects, but the 
necessity of the past need not depend upon any explanation for our lack of 
power over the past. We will return to the causal arrow in section II. For 
this section I will not assume any laws of causality. What I will assume is 
that the modalities of necessity and contingency apply to the past and the 
future respectively and are related in standard ways. Let temporal modali-
ty be expressed by "now-necessary", "now-possible", "now-impossible", 
and "now-contingent". I will assume the following relations among the 
temporal modalities: P is now-necessary if and only if not p is now-impos-
sible. If p is now-necessary, p is now-possible. If p, P is now-possible. To 
say that p is now-contingent is to say that it is now-possible that p and it is 
now-possible that not p. 
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The Principle of the Necessity of the Past can be formulated as follows: 
Principle of the Necessity of the Past 
If B is a proposition about the past and B is true, then nect B. 
Given the relation defined above between the now-necessary and the now-
possible, when B is a true proposition about the past, it follows that not 
pOSStnot B. 
Systems of modal logic always include a transfer of necessity principle 
for logical necessity. As applied to temporal necessity, the principle is the 
following: 
Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP) 
Nect p, Nec (p ->q) > Nect q, 
which is logically equivalent to 
Transfer of Possibility Principle (TPP) 
POSt p, Nec (p->q) > POSt q. 
TNP has the consequence that logically necessary propositions have the 
necessity of the past since a logically necessary truth is entailed by every 
proposition. I find this peculiar, but since nothing in what follows turns on 
it, I will not modify the principle here in the interests of simplicity.2 
Let us say that an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) is any being 
x who satisfies the following condition: Necessarily, for any proposition p 
and time t at which x exists, x believes p at t if and only if p. Essential 
omniscience can be shown to be inconsistent with modal temporal asym-
metry as described above by the following argument: 
1st Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry 
Let B = the proposition that I will pour tea at noon tomorrow. 
(1) There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient fore-
knower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma] 
The Principle of the Contingency of the Future tells us that 
(2) It is now- possible that B and it is now- possible that not B. 
From (1) and the definition of an EOF it follows that 
(3) Necessarily (B -> The EOF believed before now that B), and 
necessarily (not B -> The EOF believed before now that not B) . 
By the Transfer of Possibility Principle (TPP), (2) and (3) entail 
(4) It is now- possible that the EOF believed before now that Band 
it is now- possible that the EOF believed before now that not B. 
From (1) and the definition of an EOF we get 
(5) Either the EOF believed before now that B or the EOF believed 
before now that not B. 
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From the Principle of the Necessity of the Past we get 
(6) If he did, it is not now-possible that he did not, and if he did 
not, it is not now-possible that he did. 
(5) and (6) entail 
(7) Either it is not now- possible that he did not or it is not now-
possible that he did. 
But (7) contradicts (4).3 
We can formulate a parallel argument using TNP instead of TPP: 
2nd Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry 
(1) There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient fore-
knower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma] 
(1) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tell us that 
(2') Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed B before now 
or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not B before now. 
From (1) and the definition of an EOF it follows that 
(3') Necessarily (The EOF believed before now that B -> B), and 
necessarily (The EOF believed before now that not B -> not B) 
By the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), (2') and (3') entail 
(4') Either it is now-necessary that B or it is now-necessary that not 
B. 
(4') is logically equivalent to 
(5') Either it is not now-possible that B or it is not now-possible that 
notB. 
From the Principle of the Contingency of the Future we get 
(6') It is now-possible that B and it is now-possible that not B. 
But (6') contradicts (5'). 
These arguments have nothing to do with free will. They show that the 
conflict between an essentially omniscient foreknower and free will rests 
upon a deeper conflict between essential omniscience and the modal asym-
metry of past and future. In short, the following form an inconsistent triad: 
(a) The existence of modal temporal asymmetry expressed in the contin-
gency of the future and the necessity of the past [premises (2) and (6), and 
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(2') and (6')]. 
(b) The possibility that there is an essentially omniscient foreknower. 
[Premise (1)] 
( c) The Transfer of Possibility Principle or equivalently, the Transfer of 
Necessity Principle. 
The problem of fatalism is not really about freedom or fate; it is about a 
type of modality that is temporally asymmetrical and that is transferred 
over logical entailment. If this type of modality is coherent, it rules out the 
possibility of essential omnisicience. It follows that God could not have 
"given up" infallible foreknowledge in order to save human freedom since 
fundamentally the problem is not about free will at all.' 
But the problem is even more general than this triad illustrates. The 
reason essential omniscience conflicts with temporal modality and the 
transfer principles is that the existence of an EOF requires that a proposi-
tion about the past entails a proposition about the future. But it straight-
forwardly follows from TNP that a proposition that is now-necessary can-
not entail a proposition that is not now-necessary. So if the past is now-
necessary and the future is not, a proposition about the past cannot entail 
a proposition about the future. Further, it follows from TPP that a propo-
sition that is now-possible cam10t entail a proposition that is not now-pos-
sible. But false propositions about the past are not now-possible. If the 
future is contingent, and p is about the future, both p and not pare now-
possible. But if p is logically equivalent to a proposition about the past, 
one of either p or not p entails a false proposition about the past. Hence a 
proposition that is now-possible entails a proposition that is not now-pos-
sible, contrary to TPP. The conclusion is that if asymmetrical temporal 
modality is coherent, it can obey TNP and TPP, or it can permit a proposi-
tion about the past to entail or be logically equivalent to a proposition 
about the future, but not both. 
The root of the problem, then, is that it is impossible for there to be a 
type of modality that has the following features: 
(a) The past and future are asymmetrical in that the past is necessary 
with respect to this type of modality, whereas the future is contingent with 
respect to this type of modality. 
(b') There are propositions about the past that entail (or are logically 
equivalent to) propositions about the future. 
(c) TNP (or equivalently, TPP) obtains. 
For most forms of modality M, we simply accept the transfer principles for 
M. But if there is a type of modality that is temporally asymmetrical, that 
pressures us to resist any principle of temporal modality that results in the 
past having the contingency of the future or the future having the necessity 
of the past under pain of reducing temporal modality to incoherence. It 
might be thought that a way out of this dilemma is to say that the transfer 
principles need not transfer the same type of necessity or possibility to q as 
is possessed by p. We could formulate a principle that transfers a type of 
necessity to q from the type of necessity possessed by p, whether or not it is 
the same type of necessity in both cases. This approach would avoid the 
incoherence of maintaining that TNP forces us to conclude that the future 
has the necessity of the past, but it does mean that the future has whatever 
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type of necessity is transferred from the necessity of the past. This 
approach faces the same dilemma as the one addressed in this section, only 
it is more subtle. If the intuitions that undergird the necessity of the past 
require modal temporal asymmetry, the idea that the future inherits a type 
of necessity from the past undermines those intuitions. Modal temporal 
asymmetry is in tension with (b') and (c ) whether or not the necessity the 
future inherits from the past is exactly the same kind of necessity as the 
necessity of the past. 
We have seen that the problem of foreknowledge and free will is not 
about free will. Now we see that it is not even about foreknowledge. It is 
about the logic of a modality that expresses a common view of time. Either 
(a), (b'), or (c ) is false. Either the transfer principles are false, it is not possi-
ble for a proposition about the past to entail a proposition about the future, 
or the modal asymmetry of time is confused.s Since the transfer principles 
are a part of every system of modal logic, the price of denying them is to 
adopt a non-standard system of temporal modality. But there is also a high 
metaphysical cost for taking the second option. If it is impossible that a 
proposition about the past can entail a proposition about the future, much 
more is ruled out than the possibility of infallible foreknowledge. It is 
impossible that there is a perfect rememberer, a being who infallibly 
remembers everyone of her past conscious states. It is impossible that 
there is a perfectly constant lover, someone who necessarily continues to 
love once he begins to love. It is impossible that matter is indestructible. In 
fact, it is impossible that anything is indestructible. Each of these meta-
physical hypotheses requires that it is metaphysically necessary that if 
some proposition about the past is true (e.g., matter existed), some proposi-
tion about the future is true (e.g., matter will exist next year). I do not find 
this option very appealing either." 
The final option is to reject modal temporal asymmetry as described in 
this section. Some form of temporal asymmetry is so firmly ingrained in 
ordinary thinking that it is virtually impossible to give it up, but that does 
not mean that the temporal arrow has been accurately described using 
standard modal notions. In order to choose among rejecting (a), (b'), or (c ), 
I propose that we take a closer look at the temporal arrow. 
II. The causal arrow of time 
In describing temporal asymmetry in section I, I made it artificially sim-
ple. I also followed common practice in subsuming temporal asymmetry 
under the standard modalities of necessity and possibility which are 
assumed to be related in standard ways. This approach may make it seem 
obvious that the modalities of past and future are describable by the 
axioms of modal logic, including TNP. But I find it interesting that ordi-
nary people rarely refer to the past as "necessary", and it is even less clear 
that they assume the standard relations among the modalities in their 
thinking about time. If a proposition is necessary, it is possible, but do we 
normally think of the past as possible? The negation of a necessary truth is 
impossible, but it seems to me that instead of treating propositions about 
the past and their negations as having contrary modalities, both the actual 
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past and all alternate pasts are typically put in the category of what we can-
not do anything about. Perhaps the logical relations among the necessary, the 
possible, and the impossible are more precise renderings of vague and 
untutored (and untrustworthy) ordinary intuitions about time. But it is 
also possible that the relations assumed in the previous section express to 
some extent a false precision. The idea that we cannot do anything about 
the past whereas we can in principle do something about (a portion of) the 
future is part of a network of ideas about time and causality. If there is an 
inconsistency within the network, the resolution of the conflict ought to do 
as little damage as possible to the network as a whole. 
I will not attempt to identify all the key components of the network of 
beliefs about time and causation that underly the intuition of modal tem-
poral asymmetry, but I want to call attention to a few features that I think 
are relevant to resolving the inconsistency identified in the last section. 
First of all, I suspect that the intuitive basis for modal temporal asymmetry 
would be badly shaken if certain laws of causality turned out to be false, in 
particular, the law that causes must precede their effects. If I am right in 
this conjecture, what leads us to think there is a modal temporal arrow is 
our beliefs about what accompanies past and future, not pastness and futu-
rity per se. The reason why we think we can do nothing about spilled milk 
may not be the pastness of the spilled milk in itself, but pastness conjoined 
with the metaphysical principle that the cause must be prior to the effect. If 
this is the deeper intuition behind the modal asymmetry of time, it would 
explain the fact that we do not think our power over the future is on a par 
with our lack of power over the past. The entire past is outside the realm of 
causal power, but that does not mean that the entire future is within the 
realm of causal power. We have no causal power over the past because it is 
too late to either cause it or to prevent it whether or not any of it is causally 
contingent, but we also have no power to prevent what is causally neces-
sary in the future, although we can cause it. In fact, somebody or some-
thing must cause it if it is causally necessary. The most interesting category 
is that which we have both the power to cause and the power to prevent. If 
there is anything in this category, it has to be in the future. Temporal asym-
metry, then, is fundamentally an asymmetry in what is causable. Anything 
that is either past or causally impossible is not causable. What is neither 
past nor causally impossible is causable. We can define the causally closed 
and causally open in terms of what is causable: Proposition p is causally 
closed just in case neither p nor not p is causable. Proposition p is causally 
open just in case both p and not pare causable. The entire past is causally 
closed; some of the future (it is hoped) is causally open. 
The modes of causable and not causable as just described do not corre-
spond very well to the standard modes of necessary, possible, impossible, 
and contingent. The actual past is not causable, but alternative pasts are 
not causable either. If it is too late to make something have happened, it is 
too late to make something else have happened instead. So if a proposition 
p is about the past, neither p nor not p is causable; p and not p are causally 
closed. This is one dis analogy with the standard modalities since if p is 
necessary, its negation is impossible. The realm of standard modality is 
divided into the possible and the impossible. The necessary is a subset of 
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the possible and the contingent is the possible that is not necessary. In con-
trast, the modes I am suggesting divide events into the causable and the 
not causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such that both p 
and not p are not causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such 
that both p and not pare causable. And there is a set of propositions p 
which are such that pis causable and not p is not causable. I am not assum-
ing that none of these sets is empty. The three categories are meant only to 
describe the logical possibilities of causability. 
I propose that the intuition of temporal asymmetry is related to caus-
ability in the following way: 
( i ) If a proposition p is about the past, p is not causable and not p is not 
causable. Propositions about the past are causally closed. [Principle of the 
Causal Closure of the Past] 
(ii) If a proposition p is about the future and p is true, p is causable. 
[Principle of the Causability of the Future r 
(iii) There are propositions p about the future which are such that both p 
and not p are causable. Such propositions are causally open. 
(iv) There are propositions p about the future which are such that p is 
causable and not p is not causable. The former are causally necessary and 
the latter are causally impossible. 
These features seem to me to express the intuitive idea that a cause must 
precede its effect and that some of the future is causally determined, but 
some of it is not. Even if it turns out that all of the future is causally deter-
mined- and that needs to be decided on metaphysical and empirical 
grounds, not by the logic of cause, the causal arrow as just described recog-
nizes a difference between our causal relation to the past and our causal 
relation to the future. 
A more complicated part of the network of intuitions about time 
involves the metaphysically necessary conditions for events of certain 
kinds to occur. There is a time-honored metaphysical principle of causation 
that nothing can come from nothing. According to that principle, the 
proposition that something will exist in the future entails the proposition 
that something existed in the past. If it is metaphysically necessary that no 
object can come into existence uncaused, then the proposition that some x 
will exist in the future entails that some y existed in the past that is in the 
causal chain leading to the existence of x. If it is not metaphysically neces-
sary that an object be caused by its actual causes, then the objects in the 
causal chain leading to x in one world will not be identical to the objects in 
the causal chain leading to x in another world. Nonetheless, there is no 
possible world containing a future x that does not have something existing 
in the past that is causally necessary for x's existence in that world. 
Let us now consider the transfer principles for causability parallel to 
those for necessity and possibility: 
Transfer of Causability Principle (TCP) 
Causable p, Nec (p -> q) > Causable q 
Transfer of Noncausability Principle (TNCP) 
Not causable p, Nec (p ->q) > Not causable q 
These principles are false as stated and must be modified. Since a logically 
necessary truth is entailed by every proposition, TCP has the consequence 
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that if q is logically necessary, q is causable. But surely nobody has the 
causal power to bring about the truth of a logically necessary proposition. 
To avoid this problem TCP must be amended: 
Transfer of Causability Principle 2 (TCP2) 
Causable p, Nee (p -> q), & q is not logically necessary> Causable q 
Similarly, since an impossible proposition entails every proposition, TNCP 
has the consequence that if p is logically impossible, q is not causable no 
matter what q is. It also needs to be amended: 
Transfer ofNoncausability Principle 2 (TNCP2) 
Not causable p, Nee (p ->q), & p is not logically impossible> Not caus-
able q." 
The causal arrow, the assumption that a proposition about the past 
entails a proposition about the future, and TNCP2 can be shown to be 
inconsistent. The argument is similar to the second dilemma of section I 
except that since neither of the propositions The EOF believed B before now 
and The EOF believed not B before now are causable, two contradictions fol-
low. A more interesting comparison is the form of the dilemma using 
TCP2 which is revealingly different from the first dilemma of section 1. The 
causal arrow and TCP2 is inconsistent with the assumption that a proposi-
tion about the future entails a proposition about the past. The principle that 
nothing can come from nothing will suffice to generate the inconsistency. 
Let us consider the proposition that some human female will exist in the 
future. If there is more than one future human female, pick one for the sake 
of the argument and call her Eve. It is not necessary to assume that Eve's 
existence is open, that is, that both the proposition that Eve will exist and 
its negation are causable. It is sufficient that either Eve's existence or her 
non-existence is causable. The dilemma therefore does not assume the 
falsehood of determinism. 
Dilemma of Causal Asymmetry 
(10) Necessarily [(Eve will exist in the future -> The causally neces-
sary conditions for Eve's existence obtained in the past, & (Eve 
will not exist in the future -> the causally necessary conditions 
for Eve's non-existence obtained in the past)] 
The Principle of the Causability of the Future tell us that 
(11) Either it is causable that Eve will exist or it is causable that Eve 
will not exist. 
From TCP2 we get 
(12) Either it is causable that the causally necessary conditions for 
Eve's existence obtained in the past or it is causable that the 
causally necessary conditions for Eve's non-existence obtained 
in the past. 
From the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Past it follows that 
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(13) It is neither causable that the causally necessary conditions for 
Eve's existence obtained in the past nor causable that the 
causally necessary conditions for Eve's non-existence obtained 
in the past. 
But (13) contradicts (12). 
If Eve's existence is causally open, (11) will be a conjunction instead of a 
disjunction, permitting the derivation of two contradictions by the above 
pattern. The conclusion is that whether or not the future is causally open, 
the following forms an inconsistent triad: 
(a') The past and future are causally asymmetrical in that the past is 
not causable whereas the future is causable. 
(b") There are propositions about the future that entail propositions 
about the past. 
(c') TCP2 obtains. 
I find this a particularly intriguing dilemma because there is an inconsis-
tency in the causal arrow not only when a proposition about the past 
entails or is equivalent to a proposition about the future, but even when a 
proposition about the future entails a proposition about the past. 
Furthermore, the dilemma does not depend upon the openness of the 
future in the sense that for some propositions p about the future, both p 
and not pare causable. The only assumption needed to generate the dilem-
ma is that propositions about the future are causable, whether or not their 
negations are causable as well. 
III. The options 
What are the options for avoiding inconsistency in the causal arrow of 
time? How do they compare with those for escaping the inconsistency in the 
modal arrow? The options for escaping the two dilemmas are as follows: 
Modal Arrow dilemma 
1. The modal arrow is an illusion 
2. A proposition about the past cannot entail (nor be logically 
equivalent to) a proposition about the future. 
3. TNP and TPP are false. 
Causal Arrow dilemma 
1. The causal arrow is an illusion. 
2. A proposition about the future cannot entail or be entailed by a 
proposition about the past. 
3. TCP2 and TNCP2 are false. 
There is a difference in the plausibility of the first option in the two dilem-
mas if I am right that the causal arrow as described in section II is more plau-
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sible than the modal temporal arrow described in section 1. The two arrows 
are obviously related, but they are not identical and I suggest that the intu-
itions about causality described in the last section are the underpinnings of 
the modal arrow of time. If the law that causes must precede effects turned 
out to be false, the modal arrow would collapse. Furthermore, the belief that 
there are causally necessary events in the future puts an important limitation 
on the intuition of temporal asymmetry that explains why the principle of 
the contingency of the future is weaker than the principle of the necessity of 
the past. The causal arrow reveals that; the modal temporal arrow does not. 
Of course, further investigation may reveal that both arrows are illusory, but 
I think the causal arrow is much less likely to be mistaken. I suggest, then, 
that whereas the modal arrow may be confused, the first option to escape the 
causal arrow dilemma is not very appealing and should be taken only as a 
last resort. In any case, almost all writers on both sides of the debate over 
theological fatalism assume the causal arrow. 
That reduces our options for the causal dilemma to the second and third. 
Consider next the second option. As we saw in the discussion of the modal 
dilemma, there is a metaphysical price for taking the second option since it 
rules out the possibility that a proposition about the past entails a proposi-
tion about the future, and hence it is impossible that matter is indestructible, 
that there is a perfect rememberer, and many others. The second option in 
the causal dilerruna is even more restrictive since it also rules out the possi-
bility that a proposition about the future entails a proposition about the 
past. So it makes the traditional metaphysical principle that nothing can 
come from nothing metaphysically impossible. Furthermore, it is likely that 
there are particular metaphysically necessary conditions that must obtain 
prior to any given event. If so, the proposition that the event occurs entails 
a proposition about conditions obtaining previously. A simple way this can 
occur is when an event is part of a more complex event extended in time, 
say a baseball game. A necessary condition for the ninth inning to begin is 
that eight innings have been previously played. So the proposition 
expressed by "The ninth inning is about to begin" entails "Eight innings 
were played already." More complex conditions are those required for the 
exercise of human agency. I am not interested in identifying any particular 
conditions for human agency here. I merely want to point out that there 
probably are some. For example, propositions about future human choices 
probably entail propositions about the past existence of rational beings. 
More subtle examples involve responses to past events. It is arguably neces-
sary that nobody can forgive someone for a past wrong unless something 
previously happened that is the object of the forgiveness. 9 But according to 
the option we are considering, the transfer principles are permitted to 
trump all of the metaphysical postulates we have considered: that matter is 
indestructible, that nothing can come from nothing, that essential omni-
science or a perfect rememberer is possible, that the beginning of the ninth 
inning entails that eight innings have been previously played, etc. Of 
course, some of these postulates may be quirky or have no basis in a plausi-
ble metaphysical theory. The issue, however, is whether their rejection 
should be decided on metaphysical grounds or whether they should be 
automatically eliminated because TCP2 and TNCP2 take precedence. 
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The final option is to reject the transfer principles. TNP and TPP are con-
sidered to be indisputable by some writers on fatalism because TNP is an 
axiom of modal logic, but the same defense cannot be made of TCP2 and 
TNCP2. Neither is an instance of a standard transfer of modality principle 
and causability is not a standard modality. TCP2 and TNCP2 need defense. 
It seems to me that TCP2 and TNCP2 are probably false, but my purpose 
in this paper is not to argue for their falsehood, but to argue that there are 
metaphysical costs in adopting TCP2 and TNCP2 that are much more far-
reaching than merely denying the possibility of essential omniscience. 
Rejecting TCP2 and TNCP2 leaves open the possibility that a proposi-
tion about the future entails a proposition about the past and that a propo-
sition about the past entails a proposition about the future. Such possibili-
ties in particular cases would be decided by features of logic and meta-
physics that do not automatically give precedence to the transfer princi-
ples. This option has the advantage of not ruling out in advance the 
hypothesis that nothing comes from nothing, that matter is indestructible, 
that there is an essentially omniscient being, and many others. Whether 
TNP and TPP are false also is somewhat more problematic because I have 
already given reasons for thinking that the modal temporal arrow is con-
fused, or at least incompletely described. Since it is not clear to me that the 
standard modalities apply to time at all, I have no position on rejecting 
TNP and TPP.lO 
I conclude that the logic of modality does not force us to accept the 
transfer of causability and non-causability principles. It does not even force 
us to accept the transfer of necessity and the transfer of possibility princi-
ples for temporal modality. The way we escape the inconsistency in the 
causal and modal arrows of time is the result of metaphysical choice. 
III. The Tooley defense ofTNP 
Michael Tooley argues in his critique of my book on foreknowledge that 
TNP is true for temporally asymmetrical necessity as he defines it.!1 He 
uses the convention of calling the necessity of the past accidental necessity, 
which he defines as follows: 
It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if p is not pre-
ventable at t. 
After a few attempts at interpreting preventability, Tooley settles on the 
following definition of accidental necessity: 
(AN) It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if no 
being, either actual or possible, acting at time t, could causally 
bring it about that p is false. (220). 
By this definition accidental necessity is not the same as the necessity of the 
past, the modality I addressed in section I. Instead, accidental necessity is 
close to what I have called causability: 
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Why might one think that this connection [between accidental neces-
sity and preventability] obtains? The basic reason is that, in the world 
as it is, we can perform actions that determine, at least in part, how 
the future is, but we cannot perform actions that determine how the 
past is, and it seems plausible that it is this fact about the world that 
leads many people to feel that there is a deep asymmetry between the 
past and the future, and, in particular, that the past is fixed, or acci-
dentally necessary, while the future is not. For suppose, by contrast, 
that we were able to perform actions now that would determine how 
the past is. Surely we would no longer view past events as accidental-
ly necessary. (p. 219). 
So Tooley thinks of accidental necessity as temporally asymmetrical in that 
the past has it and some part of the future does not. Further, it is a type of 
necessity that depends upon the view that we have no causal power over 
the past. Given that intuition, we can no more bring about the past than 
prevent it, but it is preventability that Tooley thinks is particularly salient 
for the foreknowledge dilemma. Tooley says (AN) is very plausible (220). 
Notice first that (AN) cannot capture what Tooley intends by accidental 
necessity since it immediately follows from (AN) that logically impossible 
propositions are accidentally necessary. (AN) therefore must be modified: 
(AN2) It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if p is 
not logically impossible and no being, either actual or possi-
ble, acting at time t, could causally bring it about that p is 
false. 
Tooley says that given (AN), it can be shown that the transfer of necessi-
ty is true for accidental necessity. His demonstration consists of (AN) and 
one premise which he asserts is an analytic truth, and which is logically 
equivalent to the conclusion he wants to prove. His argument is as follows: 
(1) It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if no 
being, actual or possible, acting at time t, could causally bring it 
about that p is false. (AN) 
Tooley follows this with the premise he takes to be analytic: 
(2) If P entails q, then causally to bring it about that q is false is also 
causally to bring it about that p is false. 
From (2) it follows that 
(3) If P entails q, and some actual or possible being, acting at time t 
could causally bring it about that q is false, then that being, act-
ing at t, could also bring it about that p is false. 
By contraposition he gets 
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(4) If P entails q, and no actual or possible being, acting at time t, 
could causally bring it about that p is false, then no actual or 
possible being, acting at time t, could causally bring it about 
that q is false. 
By (AN) he concludes 
(5) If P entails q, and it is accidentally necessary that p at t, then it is 
accidentally necessary that q at t. (Transfer of Accidental 
Necessity Principle) 
Notice first that (2), which Tooley takes to be an analytic truth, is false. If 
p is logically impossible, p entails q no matter what q is. Hence, according 
to (2), to causally bring about that some q is false is to causally bring it about 
that a logically impossible proposition is false. But surely we do not get 
causal credit for bringing about the falsehood of every logically impossible 
proposition whenever we bring about the falsehood of some other proposi-
tion. So we must add the qualification that p is not impossible to (2): 
(2a) If p entails q and p is not logically impossible, then causally to bring 
it about that q is false is also causally to bring it about that pis false. 12 
But whether or not (2) is modified as (2a), it is just another form of the 
transfer of necessity principle that Tooley wants to prove. The conclusion is 
logically equivalent to the premise, as his own argument shows. And if (4) 
is not analytic, neither is (2), so the argument above is hardly a proof of it. 
So Tooley does not have a proof of his transfer principle. Notice also 
that his transfer principle (5) is not a standard transfer of necessity princi-
ple, but is equivalent to the transfer of causability principle (TCP): 
causable p, nec (p ->q) > causable q. 
The equivalence follows from the fact that to cause p to be true is to cause 
not p to be false. Hence, TCP is equivalent to 
Nec (p -> q), causable not p is false> causable not q is false. 
By contraposition and exportation we get 
Nec (not q -> not p), causable not p is false> causable not q is false, 
which by substitution is equivalent to 
Nec (p -> q), causable q is false> causable p is false. 
By exportation we get 
Nec (p ->q) > (causable q is false> causable p is false). 
And contraposition yields 
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Nec (p ->q) > (not causable p is false> not causable q is false), 
which is the same as Tooley's (4). His (5) is a substitution in (4) of his defin-
ition of accidental necessity (AN). 
So Tooley accepts TCP. That means he is faced with the dilemma of the 
causal arrow. Given his acceptance of TCP (suitably modified to TCP2), if 
he is serious about the assumption of temporal causal asymmetry to which 
he appeals in explaining accidental necessity, he must reject the possibility 
of entailments between propositions about the past and propositions about 
the future, not just the possibility of infallible foreknowledge of the contin-
gent future, as shown in section II. 
In explaining his own position, Tooley says, "If, as I have argued in 
detail elsewhere, the future is not real, then I think it can be shown that it is 
logically impossible for anyone to have knowledge of future states of 
affairs unless those states of affairs are causally determined." (223). But if 
the futurity of the future makes it unreal, then the causally determined 
future is unreal also. And if unreality is sufficient to make something 
unknowable, the determined future should be unknowable as well. In any 
case, the problem is not knowability; it is a problem about logical relations 
between past and future propositions. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that the perennial dilemma of infallible fore-
knowledge and free will is not unique to either foreknowledge or free will. 
The problem arises for a multitude of metaphysical hypotheses in addition 
to the hypothesis of essential omniscience, and it reveals an inconsistency 
between any of these hypotheses and a common view of the asymmetry of 
time. No particular solution to the problem is forced. We are neither forced 
to give up temporal asymmetry nor the possibility that there are entailments 
between propositions about the past and the future, nor are we forced to 
give up the principle that the relevant type of temporally asymmetrical 
modality is closed under entailment. But we are forced to give up one of the 
three. The choice ought to be made on metaphysical grolmds, retaining as 
much as possible our firmest intuitions about time and causality. 
Notice that any approach to the classic dilemma of theological fatalism 
that is specifically designed to handle essential omniscience, such as the 
timelessness move or the Ockhamist move, will not help with the dilemmas 
of this paper. It is, of course, possible, perhaps likely, that there is more than 
one solution to the foreknowledge/free will dilemma, but whatever solves 
the dilemmas of this paper will solve the foreknowledge dilemma as well. 
Notice also that the problem of this paper is independent of determinism. 
It is sometimes argued that if determinism is true, there is no problem of the-
ological fatalism because determinism has the consequence that whatever 
kind of freedom we have is compatible with the inability to do otherwise. But 
the problem of this paper arises whether or not freedom requires the ability to 
do otherwise since freedom is not the problem. There is a conflict within a 
common view of time whether or not the universe is causally determin.ed. 
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NOTES 
1. I am assuming that both causally contingent and causally necessary 
events exist. If all events are causally necessary, it is obvious that causal neces-
sity is not the same thing as the necessity of the past. 
2. I will not distinguish logical and metaphysical necessity in this paper. I 
asssume that a logically or metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is 
true in all possible worlds. 
3. I first presented a form of this argument in the Appendix to The 
Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (Oxford University Press, 1991). A ver-
sion close to the one here appears in "Omniscience, Time, and Freedom," Guide 
to Philosophy of Religion, edited by William Mann, forthcoming, Blackwell. In 
that paper I did not notice that TPP is used in the inference to (4). I thank Ray 
Elugardo for pointing that out to me. 
4. The view called the Open God view or Free Will theism has the posi-
tion that God takes the risk of not having infallible foreknowledge in order to 
give humans free will. But if my argument here is right, there is nothing to give 
up because infallible foreknowledge is metaphysically impossible if time is 
modally asymmetrical and TNP holds. If time is not modally asymmetrical or 
TNP is false, giving up infallible foreknowledge is not necessary. For a defense 
of the open God view see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William 
Hasker, and David Basinger. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the 
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
5. I suggest that the modal asymmetry of time is incoherent in 
"Omniscience, Time, and Freedom." 
6. Notice that the option of rejecting (b') also rules out the possibility that 
the following propositions are both logically equivalent and have different 
temporal modalities: 
(1) It was true yesterday that X would happen tomorrow. 
(2) X will happen tomorrow. 
Either (1) and (2) are not logically equivalent or it is not the case that (1) has the 
necessity of the past whereas (2) does not. Propositions like (1) and (2) are, of 
course, the ones typically used in arguments for logical fatalism. This shows 
that the deeper problem of logical fatalism is not a problem about fatalism 
either. 
7. Principle (ii) will need a qualification if there are events that are literally 
uncaused, such as the decay of an atom of plutonium. I assume that such 
events do not affect the causability of the ordinary events that are the topic of 
this paper. I thank Bill Hasker for pointing out this problem with the principle 
of the causability of the future. 
S. These principles are forms of what William Hasker calls "Power 
Entailment Principles," which he defends in a number of places. See God, Time, 
and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), and "Zagzebski on 
Power Entailment," Faith and Philosophy 10, #2 (April 1993), 2250-255, and my 
rejoinder in the same issue. 
9. I thank Dan Speak for this example. 
10. Note that TNP and TPP would fail if sentences of the form "It is now-
possible that p" and "It is now-necessary that p" are hyper-intensional. A con-
text U is hyper-intensional when logically equivalent propositions are not inter-
substitutable in U. For example, belief contexts are hyper-intensional since we 
cannot substitute "The even prime number is greater than I" for "2 is greater 
than 1" in the sentence "Sally believes that 2 is greater than 1." Sally may be a 
young child who knows that 2 is greater than 1, but has never heard of prime 
numbers. If contexts of temporally relative modality are hyper-intensional, the 
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proposition The essentially omnisicient foreknower believed B before now is not inter-
substitutable with the logically equivalent proposition B in (2) and (2'). Unlike 
belief contexts, however, I doubt that we can appeal to our intuitions to settle 
the issue of whether temporally modal contexts are hyper-intensional. 
11. Michael Tooley, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy 
17.2 (April 2000), 212-224. 
12. Bill Hasker has observed to me that Tooley's (2) is false for another rea-
son. It may be that p is false for some reason that is independent of the truth of 
q. For example, p might be the proposition Hasker is short of money and AI Gore 
is US President, and q is the proposition Hasker is short of money. I can cause the 
falsehood of q by giving Hasker money, but I do not thereby cause the false-
hood of p, which is already false. 
